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I. Introduction
The legal principle of self-defence has been developed through customary 
international law and Article 51 of the UN Charter. Until the early 20th century, the 
decentralised character of international law has recognised the right of self-
defence in international society to be self-evident. It was only after the 
establishment of international organisations that the right of self-defence has been 
transformed into the ‘subject of the most fundamental disagreement between 
states and between writers.’(1) The principal question arises upon the relationship 
between the prohibition of the use of force and the right of self-defence. The first 
position starts with an assumption that there exists a general agreement among 
jurists that the UN Charter prohibits self-help and armed reprisals.(2) However, at 
the same time, they share the same interpretation in common that Article 51 of the 
Charter legitimises the use of force for ‘the necessity of safeguarding the integrity 
and inviolability of the territory of the state.’(3) This implies that the right of self-
defence is ‘engendered by, and embedded in, the fundamental right of States to 
survive.’(4) With regard to this point, common explanations perceive the 
controversy between the prohibition of the use of force and the exercise of self-
defence as a relationship between norms and the ‘exception’ in international 
law.(5) They neglect the fact that the essence of self-defence is ‘self-help’ and even 
rationalise it in the name of necessity.(6) In contrast, the second position claims 
that ‘no true law exists as long as the principle of self-help prevails.’(7) They insist 
that the establishment of the United Nations is a process of bringing the 
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centralisation to international law where the use of force is restricted except ‘the 
execution of the sanction.’(8) For the latter position, the right of self-defence 
prescribed by Article 51 evinces the fact that international law is nothing more 
than ‘primitive law.’(9)
Up to the present time, no agreement has been settled over the fundamental 
character of the right of self-defence under Article 51. However, there exists a 
‘common perception’ of international lawyers’ that international law of self-
defence has been changed fundamentally after the attacks of September 11.(10) 
Immediately after the events, two resolutions, 1368 and 1373, condemned the 
attacks as ‘an act of international terrorism’ and reaffirmed ‘the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United 
Nations.’(11) The events appeared to be a turning point of international law which 
‘have changed the context of UN activities.’(12) In short, this arises a fundamental 
question about whether legal approach is capable of identifying ‘change’ in 
international law. Legal debates on the exercise of self-defence against terrorism, 
however, remain to be the ‘never-ending story.’(13) Most international lawyers 
criticise the legal unclearness of the definition of terrorism only to discuss whether 
the exceptional character of self-defence under Article 51 authorises the use of 
force against terrorism. This brought about a further question possible to recognise 
the ‘change’ of international law without any consensus of the legal character of 
self-defence against terrorism. 
Sara Davie proposes a typical response to this question. Legalists, she says, 
are unable to determine whether the continual breach of law manifests the legal 
change or not, while they seek ‘to bring the law back in as a challenge to’(14) the 
delegation of international law. She concerns the possibility that legalists fail to 
distinguish the detainment of international law from a legal, non-exceptional, and 
justified acts.’(15) On one side, she develops her theory to compete with the 
advocators of ‘exception’ in international law. On the other side, however, she 
implied that legalists were unable to evaluate whether self-defence against 
terrorism was the breach of law or the creation of new phenomena. 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the legal possibility of identifying 
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‘change’ in international law. This paper insists that the disregard of the primitive 
character of international law results in the contemporary deadlock of legal 
debates over the exercise of self-defence against terrorism. To this end, this paper 
first analyses the historical development of the concept of self-defence in 
international law. This will define the relationship among the primitive character 
of international law, the right of self-defence, and the prohibition of the use of 
force. Second, legal debates over the exercise of self-defence against terrorism 
will be outlined in order to clarify the point of discrepancy among writers after the 
attacks of September 11. Finally, the recent revival of the ‘state of exception’ will 
be examined. The ‘state of exception’ was first theorised by Carl Schmitt and his 
theory attracts more attention in the context of post-9/11 World. By re-interpreting 
the ‘state of exception’ as a critique against the deception of liberal order, the 
advocators claim that the use of force against terrorism, namely the War on Terror, 
represents the delegation of international law in the name of self-defence. In 
response to these movements, this section purports to elucidate the validity of 
referring the ‘state of exception’ as an explanation of the legal character of self-
defence after the events of September 11. Overall, this paper argues that the main 
issue of legalists lies not in their inability but in their easy-going recognition of 
‘change’ in international law without analysing its conceptual and structural 
framework. It is the arbitrary characterisations of self-defence that would 
legitimise the derogation from international legal order in the name of ‘change.’ 
Rather, accepting the ‘primitiveness’ of international legal order is the very point 
of departure that enables international law to identify its ‘change.’ Hence, the 
significance of ‘change’ involves overcoming the ‘primitiveness’ of international 
law throughout ‘monopolisation’ and ‘centralisation’ of ‘legitimate violence.’(16)
II. Prohibition of the Use of Force and the Transformation of Self-
Defence
According to Ian Brownlie, the right of self-defence was equivalent to the 
idea of self-preservation which ‘asserted parallel to, or a form of a doctrine of 
necessity.’(17) The preceding event of self-defence was the Case of the Caroline 
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(1837) with which two basic elements, ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality,’ were 
‘aptly set out’.(18) At the negotiating table between the United States and Britain in 
1842, the US Secretary Daniel Webster demanded evidence from Britain that the 
attack on the Caroline met the criteria of unreasonableness and excessiveness.(19) 
This formula is now known as the Caroline Test, which stands out the distinction 
between ‘war’ and ‘self-defence,’ and becomes more attractive after the Second 
World War.(20) Dinstein points out that the three conditions of self-defence 
proposed by Webster, ‘necessity’, ‘proportionality,’ and ‘immediacy’, remain to 
be valid as fundamental bases for ‘all the categories of self-defence.’(21) On the 
other hand, Brownlie puts more emphasis upon the different connotation of self-
defence at the time of the Case of the Caroline where the self-defence was 
recognised as a form of ‘self-preservation’ or ‘a particular instance of it.’(22) This 
implies that the ‘classical’ right of self-defence was analogous to so-called natural 
right, the right to survive, that have all individuals. Regarding this point, Ryoichi 
Taoka criticised that few legal scholars have paid attention to the original context 
of self-defence in international law that appeared first in the Case of Caroline. 
Taoka said, all the legal enquires on self-defence have to start with analysing two 
arguments proposed by the British government; 1) the Caroline was a pirate ship 
2) the use of force against the Caroline was a form of self-defence in response to 
insufficient legal enforcements by the United States in that region.(23) This reveals 
the important fact that the British government had never made an attempt to claim 
that the attack against the Caroline was a legitimate response to the breach of 
international law by the United States. In fact, as Taoka emphasises, ‘the necessity 
of preserving national interest in the emergency’ was the driving force that 
motivated the British government to attack the Caroline in the name of self-
defence.(24) It is the preservation of vital interests of each state that underlies all 
the ‘classical’ cases of self-defence including the Case of Amelia Island (1817), 
the Case of Virginius (1873), and the Case of Danish Fleet (1805). Accordingly, 
Taoka concludes that the ‘classical’ right of self-defence was akin to état de 
nécessité in municipal law.(25) 
A turning point was the criminalisation of war after the First World War.(26) At 
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the sight of the catastrophic destruction of modern warfare, the League of Nations 
was established in 1919 ripe for the sake of the general prohibition of use of force. 
Brownlie claims that the League Covenant ‘appeared to provide qualifications’ 
that the right to resort ‘war’ was ‘exceptional.’(27) Article 16 of the League 
Covenant provides as follows; ‘[s]hould any Member of the League resort to war 
in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be 
deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League.’ 
In fact, the main awareness of the League Covenant was headed for the 
establishment of mechanical procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes.(28) 
As Brownlie explains, the League Covenant imposed the prohibition of aggression 
against member states as a treaty obligation. 
In 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact progressed in the criminalisation of war 
with its comprehensive attempt to prohibit the use of force. Dinstein evaluates the 
Pact as a point of change in international law from ‘jus ad bellum’ to ‘jus contra 
bellum.’(29) Article 1 of the Pact declared ‘solemnly’ war as a ‘solution of 
international controversies’ and renounced it ‘as an instrument of national policy 
in their relations with one another.’ In parallel with the general prohibition of the 
use of force, Article 2 stipulates that ‘the settlement or solution of all disputes or 
conflicts’ shall ‘never be sought except by pacific means.’ Considering these two 
provisions interdependently, international lawers assume that the normative 
framework of the Kellogg-Briand Pact can be said as the total abolishment of the 
use of force in international law.(30) Contrary to its earnest ideal, however, the Pact 
also had a serious defect. In fact, the Pact ended up with authorising the ‘lawful’ 
use of force which took a form of a legitimate response against the breach of 
international conventions. The major great powers interpreted that Article 1 of the 
Pact authorised member states to recourse to ‘war as an instrument of international 
policy.’ For instance, France and the United States exchanged diplomatic 
documents confidentially with which they agreed to consider that the Pact 
legitimised the use of force on the basis of the League Covenant and the Locarno 
Treaties. In this regards, Carl Schmitt criticised that the Pact was merely an 
instrument of ‘modern imperialism’ which engaged only in ‘just wars’ serving for 
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international politics.(31) For Schmitt, the ‘jurisdification of international relations’ 
was nothing more than the legal justification of an imperialistic principle which 
concealed particular interests in the language of universality.(32) 
Moreover, the Pact was compelled to admit that each party state had a right 
to recall military force against an act of aggression. This was specified in the 
Preamble of the Pact which provided as follows; ‘any signatory Power which 
shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be 
denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty.’ In this context, the right of self-
defence had its meaning changed. ‘[I]n the diplomatic exchanges prior to signature 
of the treaty,’(33) major states issued their interpretive notes in order to confirm 
that they reserved their right of self-defence. Indeed, the Pact knew ‘neither the 
nature of the right nor the instances in which it could be invoked.’(34) To make 
matters worse, the lack of a central organ, which determines if the use of force by 
a state was qualified as an act of self-defence, let each member state to claim on 
their right to self-defence.(35) Another consequence of the Pact was a conversion 
of the legal character of self-defence from état de nécessité. Taoka claims that the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact turned the right of self-defence into a legal justification for 
member states to exceed the general prohibition of the use of force.(36) Thus, the 
right of self-defence became ‘a right to resort physical power against physical 
attacks.’(37) In short, it was ‘the reservations of signatories, though not the text’ 
that endangered the comprehensive prohibition of the use of force.(38) 
In this regard, the establishment of the United Nations performed no definitive 
role to prohibit the use of force legitimised in the name of self-defence. Rather, 
Article 51 of the UN Charter prescribes clearly as follows; ‘[n]othing in the 
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.’ In 
fact, the law of self-defence under the UN Charter remains to be the same form as 
the one under the Kellogg-Briand Pact. While Article 2(4) declares the general 
prohibition of the use of force, Article 51 ascertains that each state have an 
‘inherent’ right to use military forces against an act of aggression. Neither the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970) nor the Definition of Aggression (1974) 
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succeeded in defining the right of self-defence in international law. The 
Declaration on the Non-Use of Force (1987) reconfirmed that every member 
states of the UN Charter have ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs.’ In short, no international convention has 
refined the concept of the right of self-defence. Instead, according to Albrecht 
Randelzhofer, ‘an exclusive regulation’ of the right of self-defence has been 
‘confirmed by the ICJ’s Nicaragua Judgment.’(39) In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ 
judged that the right of self-defence under Article 51 ‘can only be exercised in 
response to an “armed attack” by referring to ‘the criteria of the necessity and the 
proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence.’(40) Accordingly, 
Randelzhofer argues that the ICJ succeeds in establishing rigid requirements for 
the right of self-defence that ‘supersedes and replaces’ the traditional notion of 
self-defence.(41)
   Nevertheless, the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons identified the indispensability of ‘the fundamental right of 
every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance 
with Article 51 of the Charter.’(42) Marcelo Kohen concerns that the reference to 
the notion of state survival encourages international law to justify violation of 
law, when ‘supreme’ or ‘vital’ interests are at stake, in the same way as ‘the rasion 
d’Etat in municipal law.’(43) He argues that ‘the resurgence of the idea of the state 
of nature in its Hobbesian sense’ in ‘the Court’s approach’; however, this matter 
is what Hans Kelsen anticipated already in 1950s.(44) Kelsen criticises that the 
‘fundamental problems’ of the UN Charter is its inadequacy of replacing the 
exercise of self-help by a state with an enforcement of judicial dispute 
mechanism.(45) He argues that the abolishment and the restriction of ‘the principle 
of self-help’ must fulfil ‘two requirements’; (1) having all disputes to be settled by 
International Organisation (2) establishing enforcement action of the 
Organisation.(46) On one side, he acknowledges that the primacy of law is guided 
not by ‘the science of law’ but by ‘ethical and political preferences.’(47) On the 
other side, Kelsen insists that the failure of the UN Charter in satisfying two 
fundamental requirements subordinates ‘a monopoly of force’ in ‘international 
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society’ with which the state of nature is overcome.(48) For Kelsen, it is 
indispensable for international law to interpret ‘a sanction’ in the sense of ‘just 
war.’ His concern is the possibility that the deficit of the UN Charter would result 
in the entire extinguishment of international law in the political context of the 
cold war. In short, Kelsen criticises against optimistic outlooks for international 
law which neglect insufficient development of dispute mechanism under the UN 
Charter. While international law has experienced grave transformation of 
international political structure for last 50 years, the primitive character of 
international law, as well as the right of self-defence, remains to be untouched. 
Therefore, it is argued that the appropriateness of Kelsen’s critique lasts out so 
long as international law lacks a centralised dispute mechanism, which abolishes 
the principle of self-help.(49) 
III. Legal Responses to Self-Defence after 9/11 and the War on Terror
The destructive scale of the attacks of September 11 2001 was beyond the 
compass of the imagination, and it was more than enough to make that day as ‘a 
day when consciousness changed.’(50) Before examining the legal character of the 
events, however, international law was urged to condemn the attacks as 
‘international terrorism.’(51) Immediately after the events, on 12 September, the 
UN Security Council approved Resolution 1368 which declared that ‘any act of 
international terrorism is a threat to international peace and security.’ On the same 
day, the General Assembly passed Resolution GA Res. 56/1 which called for 
‘international cooperation to bring justice the perpetrators, organizers, and 
sponsors of the outrages of September 11 2001’ and to ‘prevent and eradicate acts 
of terrorism.’(52) Finally, on 28 September, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1373 unanimously. With this issuance, all the UN member states were authorised 
to take ‘all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of September 11 
2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities 
under the Charter of the United Nations.’(53) From that time, ‘War on Terror’ 
became a legal principle that was now ‘backed by SC obligations.’(54) On one side, 
Resolution 1373 does not impose any new legal obligations but reaffirms the 
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principles ‘set out in the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism.’(55) However, on the other side, Resolution 1368 and 1373 assure that 
all necessarily responses against ‘international terrorism’ are comprised of ‘the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter 
of the United Nations.’(56)
The adoption of Resolution 1373, according to Christopher Greenwood, 
indicates that the United Nations considers ‘the terrorist attacks’ to be ‘armed 
attacks’ which recalls the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.(57) 
His enquiry starts with a question whether ‘a decision by the council to take non-
military action can restrict or prevent the exercise of the right of self-defence.’(58) 
In response to that point, he makes an assertion that ‘terrorist atrocities perpetrated 
in the United States on that date were plainly illegal.’(59) In spite that the illegality 
was grounded not on the violation of Article 2(4) but on the breach of ‘crimes 
against humanity,’ Greenwood concludes that the act of terrorism constitutes both 
‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘armed attacks.’(60) It denotes that crimes against 
humanity’ and ‘armed attack’ consist with each other, and September 11 was the 
very that were characterised ‘not only as criminal offences but also as a threat to 
international peace and security and an armed attack.’(61) While his opponents are 
anxious about the uninterrupted application of the right of self-defence, 
Greenwood asserts that the preamble of Resolution 1373 admits the counter use 
of force against terrorism to be taken ‘by way of self-defence.’(62)
Dinstein deems the attacks of September 11 to be ‘amounted to an armed 
attack’ so that the reference to self-defence pursuant to Article 51 is legitimate.(63) 
He detects an indication that the traditional meaning of the right to self-defence 
has been ‘dispelled as a result of the response of the international community.’(64) 
Since he perceives that the ‘original outrage of 9/11 could not be imputed to 
Afghanistan ex post facto,’ Dinstein focuses on the Government of Afghanistan 
being accused of complicity in the attacks.(65) Given that, the legality of the use of 
force against Afghanistan is based not on the terrorist attacks themselves but on 
the failure of Afghanistan in implementing their legal responsibilities. Sean 
Murphy notices that the overlap of terrorist attacks of September 11 with ‘armed 
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attacks’ animated the principle of Article 51.(66) He focuses on the fact that Article 
51 provides no clear condition on ‘who or what might commit an armed attack’ 
that can be justified by self-defence.(67) Murphy considers that Resolution 1973 
admits a ‘right prior to’ the UN Charter, because the right of self-defence under 
Article 51 is an ‘inherent right.’(68)
Some writers look upon Article 51 as not sufficient to legalise the use of force 
against terrorists. Thomas Frank highlights the drafting profess of Article 51 in 
order to reaffirm that the right of self-defence is distinguished from ‘international 
sanctions.’(69) He stands in a position that the Security Council legitimised the 
exercise of the right of self-defence against terrorism. Meanwhile, he raises a 
question about the ‘the potential coexistence of collective measures with the 
continued measures in self-defence’, and argues that the relationship between 
them relies primarily upon ‘subsequent practices of states.’(70) Byers expressed a 
similar opinion that the US attacks against Afghanistan are ‘widely accepted as a 
legal basis for intervention under customary international law.’(71) He infers from 
‘a two pronged legal strategy’ adopted by the United States that the use of force 
against terrorism fulfils two necessarily legal requirements of the right of self-
defence, necessity and proportionality.(72) Considering from international 
responses after September 11, Byers evaluates that the US strategy is widely 
supported by the world by which the use of force against terrorism has been 
elevated to the status of a legal principle.(73) Overall, most international lawyers 
consent to the point that Resolution 1373 makes a ‘pioneering’ and ‘ambitious’ 
contribution towards a rise in the ‘average level of government performing against 
terrorism across the globe.’(74)
Peter Rowe questions the legal unclearness of the right of self-defence against 
terrorism. It is the way of its ‘classification’ that he considers to be problematic.(75) 
Regardless of his conclusion that the US-led military operation in Afghanistan 
‘was in conformity with article 51,’ he argues that ‘the precedential value for the 
future of such a response should be such as to confine it to its own special facts.’(76) 
Resolution 1373 authorises the right of self-defence against terrorists group 
without defining ‘war’ and ‘terrorism. Nevertheless, it neglects to draw ‘lines 
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between an executive (military) and a judicial response.’(77) The unanticipated 
form and scale of September 11 makes the United Nations take exceptional 
measurements. Nevertheless, Rowe regards that the event was insufficient to 
settle the legal compatibility of the ‘War on Terror’ with international humanitarian 
law.(78) Carsten Stahn is sceptical to the legality of the ‘War on Terror’ and 
criticises that ‘the reaction to the September 11 attacks represented a rigorous 
change in the law.’(79) In contrast to Rowe, he admits that ‘the Council’s 
determinations under Article 51 of the Charter read in conjunction with the right 
to self-defence would set the framework for the permissible scope of self-
defence.’(80) Resolution 1373 fails to provide ‘permissible scope of self-defence’, 
and Stahn cautions against ‘uncertainty and indeterminacy of the limits of self-
defence.’(81) For Rowe and Stahn, the fundamental problem of the right of self-
defence after September 11 is the possible abuse of international law in the name 
of self-defence, but not the legal status of the ‘War on Terror.’ 
Some international lawyers find the fundamental difficulty of defining 
‘terrorism’ in the language of law. Even before the attacks of September 11, the 
United Nations had expressed its condemnations against ‘international terrorism.’ 
In 1994, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 49/60 which urged member 
states to ‘take all appropriate measures at the national and international levels to 
eliminate terrorism.’(82) In 1999, Resolution 1267 was adopted by the Security 
Council in order to confirm international condemnation of ‘all acts of terrorism, 
irrespective of motive, wherever and by whomever committed.’(83) It reaffirms 
that all acts of terrorism are ‘criminal and unjustifiable’, and constitute a ‘threat 
to international peace and security.’(84) Yet, Happold points out that there exists 
crucial difference between resolutions prior to September 11 and Resolution 
1373. He argues that Resolution 1373 is the first resolution that determines the 
acts of terrorism as a ‘threat to peace’ in the context of a particular situation.(85) 
Security Council is ‘the initial judge of the legality of its own acts’, and its 
resolutions are treated as ‘being legal’ as long as they are ‘valid.’(86) Referring to 
that point, Happold claims that the ‘real issue’ of Resolution 1973 is its influence 
towards Security Council ‘as a precedent’ for future legislation, but not the fact 
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that it acted ‘ultra vires.’(87) His concern is directed to ‘general and temporarily 
undefined obligations on states’ that would result in the entire destruction of ‘the 
principle of sovereign equality.’(88) Durfy criticises that ‘the political currency of 
the language of terrorism’ naturalises the disregard of international law.(89) He 
takes issue with the increase of exclusion and marginalisation of ‘objective 
safeguards’ through judicial oversight after the events of September 11 ‘in the 
name of security’.(90) Antonio Cassese emphasises the necessity of strict 
interpretation of Resolution 1373 which identifies terrorism not as an ‘armed 
attack’ but as a ‘threat to the peace.’(91) He deems that Resolution 1373 intends to 
‘authorise military and other action’ with a collective basis.(92) Cassese accepts 
that ‘global terrorism’ would recall the use of force based on the right of self-
defence. However, it is the role of ‘international community’ that decides on the 
legal changes based on the ‘generally accepted principles’, and he criticised that 
this is what the ‘War on Terror’ fails to satisfy.(93) In short, most critiques put in 
question the lack of UN initiative bypassed by the right of self-defence, but not 
the legal character of ‘War on Terror’ itself.
Overall, most international lawyers agree that the events of September 11 
evoked the right of self-defence, and it formula was reconfirmed by Resolution 
1373. However, international law knows no means to determine whether the use 
of force against terrorism formulates a new legal principle in place of the law of 
self-defence. In this context, legal debates after September 11 fall into ‘a never-
ending story.’(94)
IV. Questions about the Exceptionality of Self-Defence against 
Terrorism
In contrary to legal struggles, politics is the main driving force behind 
immediate responses of ‘international society’ against the attacks of September 
11. No sooner had the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, the US 
Congress passed the Bill entitled ‘Authorization of the Use of Force.’ When the 
then US President George W. Bush signed the Bill on 18 September, he declared 
that it was ‘necessarily and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to 
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defend itself and protect United States citizens both at home and abroad.’(95) 
Subsequently to the adoption of Resolution 1373, the United States executed 
Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October, and this ‘widening of the right of 
self-defence’ was widely accepted by ‘international society.’(96) The search for 
political legitimacy puts more emphasis on ‘wider international participation’ 
rather than its ‘initial basis in self-defence.’(97) However, the longer the operation 
continues, the more difficult it becomes to explain it in the range of self-defence. 
Then, some political theorists start expressing their doubts about juristic 
approaches to the right of self-defence after September 11. Unlike legalists, these 
political theorists grasp the legal issues of the right of self-defence against 
terrorism within a broader context of liberalism. They assume that the crisis of 
contemporary international order is resulted from ‘the unexpected links’ between 
international law and liberal cosmopolitanism. This comes down to a question 
whether the exercise of self-defence after September 11 stands between legal 
norms and politics in ‘international society.’ Meanwhile, it leads re-evaluation of 
Carl Schmitt who developed a theory of legal exception which is based on his 
critiques against liberalism.(98) Regarding this point, it will then be asked how the 
principle of self-defence is located in the framework of liberalism. In short, the 
question is whether the right of self-defence after September 11 is carried out 
within or outside from international legal order based on liberalism. 
As is well known, the core argument of Schmitt is that the ultimate foundation 
of a legal order is ‘sovereign’ who ‘decides on the state of emergency.’(99) For 
Schmitt, decision in ‘the state of emergency’ has a particular importance for 
jurisprudence because it sheds light on the essential authority of a state derived 
outside from general norms.(100) ‘All law is situational law’, Schmitt claimed, and 
it is ‘sovereign’ who ‘produces and guarantees the situation as one in its 
totality.’(101) However, liberal rationalism neglects to examine ‘the state of 
emergency’ as a matter of jurisprudence, and abandons legal explanation for ‘a 
gap of law’ where ‘Staatsrecht [public law] ends.’(102) Schmitt criticised the 
withdrawal of legal positivists from crises of legal order, and empathises the 
juristic importance of the ‘exception’ because the existence of a normal condition 
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relies upon clear recognition of the ‘exception.’(103) By facing with legal crises in 
Weimar republic, Schmitt sought to introduce the concept of ‘political’ into 
jurisprudence in order to theorise the suspension of law in a constitutional 
order.(104) In fact, his approach has two consequences. First, it identifies that the 
principal role of public legal studies is to reveal entire dependence of all the 
conceptions and formulas upon ‘prior situations’, namely, bourgeois ideology 
over liberalism.(105) Second, it discloses that constitutional legal order is founded 
upon ‘political unity’ of a constitution.(106) The concept of the ‘political’ is 
presupposition of ‘the concept of states’, which is based on the distinction between 
‘enemy and friend.’(107) To this end, Schmitt argued that the ‘measures of the state 
of emergency’ serves precisely to preserve the political existence of a constitution 
whose authority and legitimacy is grounded on the ‘political will’ of people.(108) 
Given that, it raised a question about the applicability of ‘the state of emergency’ 
in international law. As the foundational principle of international law is the 
coexistence of different political units, the theory of the ‘state of emergency’ itself 
has difficulty in providing an analytical framework for a legal order that does not 
presuppose single political unity.
Nevertheless, the actuality of international order in crisis turns ‘supporters of 
Schmitt’s work’ to focus on the resemblance between liberal states and totalitarian 
states, once they are threatened. These writers learn from Schmitt that liberal 
states would deny liberty and legitimise ‘legal black holes’ if they face with a 
threat for their survivals and necessity of constituting ‘power beyond the 
discretionary norm of a liberal society.’(109) For instance, William E. Scheuerman 
argued that ‘Schmitt’s study is disturbingly relevant to the political and legal 
world’ after September 11 because it provides a warning to unilateral behaviour 
of the United States against terrorism.(110) For Scheuerman, the Bush Administration 
exemplified Schmitt’s concern which considerers ‘the weaknesses of the existing 
legal regime for terrorism’ not as ‘a lamentable reminder of the limits of statutory 
law’ but as ‘a fundamentally norm-less realm of decision making.’(111) In spite of 
his hostility towards the ‘surrender the rule of law’, Scheuerman insists that 
learning from Schmitt is important to detect ‘a misguided quest’ of international 
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law in search of integrating ‘incongruent models of interstate relations.’(112) By 
referring Schmitt, Scheuerman seeks to figure out the limits of ‘state-centered 
Westphalian system’ in face with the rise of non-states actors. He concludes that 
the re-establishment of ‘a legal universe’ needs to be the priority of international 
law in order to ‘preserve our basic political and legal ideals’ without legal ‘black 
holes.’(113) Following Scheuerman, William Hooker considers that the 
‘contemporary debate in international relations and public international law’ 
recalled the relevance of ‘Schmitt’s language.’(114) Based on his comprehensive 
analyses of the writings of Schmitt in the field of international politics, Hooker 
argued that Schmitt provides critical insight into ‘the challenges of irregular 
violence’ to ‘regular politics.’(115) He indicated that irregularity was the very 
essence of regular politics likewise exception under the legal order. Oren Gross 
claims that theories of Schmitt have potential for an entire settlement of 
‘pathological cases of legal and political orders.’(116) While he cautions about a 
disregard for the existence of normal, Gross notices that Schmitt’s critique against 
liberalism is the very opportunity to examine critically the existing order ‘insofar 
as real world practice is concerned.’(117) Overall, ‘legal state of exception’ is 
critical of the paradox of liberalism with which liberal states are unable to cope 
with their threats without suspending the rule of law.(118) It reveals that liberal 
states have not succeeded in taming violence with the establishment of modern 
legal order. 
Some writers attempt to elicit immanent criticism of liberalism from Schmitt, 
and focus on the concept of the political inherent in the ‘state of emergency’, 
namely, the ‘political state of exception.’(119) Giorgio Agamben argues that the 
‘state of exception’ is ‘a space of anomie’ where ‘law does not apply, because of 
the existence of derogation.’(120) By giving an example of Guantanamo Bay, he 
criticised the Bush Administration for claiming “Commander in Chief of the 
Army” and legitimising ‘sovereign powers in emergency situation.(121) In other 
words, the ‘War on Terror’ is ‘a fiction sustained through military metaphor’.(122) 
The real harm of the ‘state of exception’ lies in the banishment of the distinction 
between ‘peace’ and ‘war’, or ‘foreign’ and ‘civil war.’(123) This destruction is a 
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result of ‘a suspension of order’ where the law remains in force but without its 
application.(124) In fact, ‘the state of exception’ signifies ‘the separation of “force 
of law” from the law’, and this is the point that ‘the modern theory of the state of 
exception cannot resolve.’(125) By re-examining the ‘state of exception’ in the 
context of a long history of legal tradition in Europe, Agamben warns against the 
equation of law with primitive type of violence based on the personality of 
authority. In short, ‘War on Terror’ appears to be ‘pure violence’ separated from 
international law with which the ‘state of exception’ is transformed into a 
‘paradigm of government.’(126) 
Rob Walker points out the fundamental controversy of modern states that 
they presuppose a ‘trade-off’ between liberty and security. Walker penetrates the 
essence of modern politics as ‘a very precise and intricately articulated system of 
discrimination’, which consists the foundation of sovereign power differentiating 
‘the exception’ from the ‘general rule.’(127) This line of discrimination distinguishes 
legal and illegal, and it legitimises constitutional states to put ‘freedom’ under 
‘necessity’ on the basis of law.(128) Slavoj Žižek regards the events of September 
11 as ‘direct attacks on the US or other representatives of the new global order.’(129) 
By quoting the words of John Ashcroft, ‘terrorists use America’s freedom as a 
weapon against us,’ Žižek seeks to reveal the ironic destruction of the traditional 
distinction ‘between a state of war and a state of peace.’(130) He insists that the 
world after the attacks of September 11 has entered into ‘a time in which a state 
of peace can at the same time be a state of emergency,’ that is to say, states 
restricted ‘our freedom’ in the name of the protection of civilians.(131) Louiza 
Odysseos points out the rhetorical analogy between the ‘state of nature’ and ‘the 
War on Terror.’ She argues that the War on Terror was ‘an exceedingly exemplary 
manifestation of the paradox of liberal modernity and war.’(132) She defects two 
interconnections between the liberal cosmopolitanism and the War on Terror, and 
argued that the War on Terror was ‘the quintessential liberal cosmopolitan war.’(133) 
Regarding the War on Terror as in connection with liberal cosmopolitanism 
identifies the limitation of the modern conception of war that it knows no 
limitation on the elimination of its enemies. That brings about a single formula; 
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the War on Terror will continue until terrorism is annihilated. Moreover, Odysseos 
is also critical against the ‘production and spreading of modern liberal subjectivity’ 
by the War on Terror.(134) She criticises that the War on Terror driven by liberal 
cosmopolitanism removed the difference between ‘war practices’ and ‘peace 
practices.’(135) In short ‘the political state of exception’ was critical against the 
elimination of fundamental distinction between war and politics, which was the 
ground of modern sovereign states. It shed light on the limitation of liberalism in 
face with the attacks of September 11. 
In face with these critiques, Davies claims that legalists needed to aware the 
derogation from law and to recognise it not as ‘the absence of legal norm’ but as 
‘a political lack of will to enforce the laws as they should be enforced.’(136) Her 
critique was directed to the confusion between the lack of political will and the 
defect of international law. For those arguing the ‘legal state of exception,’ the 
preservation of international legal order exceeds the legal order based on its 
necessity. However, legalists assume that international law lacks any central 
authority authorised to exceed the legal framework no matter how it is necessarily. 
The problem of legalists, however, is that they lack capacities to determine 
whether the abuse of legal norm by states signifies ‘a shift of legal precedent’ or 
not.(137) Davies considers that legalists were unable to answer whether the right of 
self-defence was transformed to legitimise the War on Terror. In this regard, her 
answer was that legalists were doomed to regard law as politics.(138) This implies 
that legalists are unable to distinguish legal and political changes in international 
law because they lack immanent legal insights for its judgement. 
Since the scale of the events were unprecedented, many international lawyers 
regard September 11 as ‘a watershed in terms of international law.’(139) From legal 
perspectives, the impact of the attack did not accelerate the centralisation of the 
legal authority in international law; rather, it legitimised states to use force against 
terrorism on the basis of the right of self-defence. Davies considered that legalists 
failed to offer counterarguments against the advocators of ‘exception’ arguing for 
legal changes in international law. However, the War on Terror has not transformed 
any legal structure in international law on the basis of either the necessity or the 
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limitation of liberalism. Davies tries to pose a question the resignation of 
international lawyers that they fail to offer ‘a sufficient change’ against the 
derogation of law.(140) Nevertheless, it is the question international lawyers are to 
execute policy debates when they face with derogation of legal principles. 
Contrary to Davies, Taoka considers that the role of international legal studies is 
to indicate the scope of legal principles such as the right of self-defence. Regarding 
this point, this paper emphasises that the legal structure has not been changed by 
the attacks of September 11. Since the right of self-defence remains to be the legal 
principle under international law on the basis of its decentralised character, the 
role of international lawyers is to examine whether the War on Terror overcomes 
the primitive character of international law. In this regard, this paper argues that 
international law has not been changed by the War on Terror because it brought 
about no legal structural change. Davies points out correctly that legalists are not 
capable to provide policy changes related to international law. However, she fails 
to notice that legalists are able to identify change in international law in reference 
to its legal structure, namely the primitive character of international legal order. 
This paper claims that the War on Terror changes no international legal principle 
in the name of politics because it does not transform the primitive character of 
international law. It remains to be important for international law to distinguish 
what it is from what it ought to be even though, as Davies says, this does not 
provide any effective policy outcomes. 
V. Conclusion
This paper argues that the War on Terror after the attacks of September 11 
does not bring about structural changes in international law. Since the principle of 
self-defence is grounded on the primitive character of international law, it is the 
primary step for legalists to enquire whether the War on Terror has resulted in 
transforming the structure of international legal order. Without these analyses, 
international legal studies are unable to distinguish legal changes from the 
derogation of law, and they even legitimise the derogation in the name of politics. 
While this paper considers that ‘change’ in international law means no more than 
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the structural departure from the primitiveness of international law, it is possible 
for legalists to examine the possible alternatives to the centralisation of legal 
authority. Yasuaki Onuma poses a question whether the way of thinking 
international law can be analogous to that of domestic legal order. This paper 
agrees to the importance of critical insights towards international legal order; 
however, it does not reduce the importance of distinguishing what it is and what 
it ought to be from international law. For legal enquires, it is important to put the 
existing legal structure at the centre so that legalists are able to identify if the 
practical events result in transforming the primitive character of international law. 
Otherwise, international law will loose a guiding principle to counter against the 
derogation of law in the name of necessity.
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<Summary>
Ryo Watanuki
This paper examines the legal debates concerning the right of self-defence 
after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Historically, the right of self-defence 
has been employed to legitimise the use of force in accordance with necessity. 
The general prohibition of war after the First World War has made the concept 
of self-defence a legitimate response to illegal use of force namely the war of 
aggression by an aggressor state. However, the UN Security Council authorises 
its member states to use their military forces against terrorists immediately after 
the event of September 11. From a legal point of view, this decision raised a 
fundamental question whether the event was crucial enough to transform the 
legal principle of the right of self-defence. Many international lawyers have 
discussed the issue only to find that the debate is a ‘never-ending story’ (Quéntivet 
2005). Contrary to these struggles of international lawyers, some political 
theorists assume that the international response against terrorism illustrates the 
limitation of liberalism as a foundational principle of international order. They 
criticise that to legitimise the War on Terror paradoxically results in justifying 
recourse to violence in the name of protection of liberty. This paper explores 
the legal possibility of identifying ‘change’ in international law by investigating 
the historical development of the right of self-defence. This paper argues that 
legalists’ inability of recognising change in international law is attributed to their 
relative neglect of the ‘primitiveness’ of international law. This paper proposes 
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to focus more on the latter in order to perceive the structure of international 
politics more correctly.

